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Abstract
This paper considers conditions of optimality in a co-optive strategy of colonial
rule. It proposes a simple model of elite formation emanating from a coloniser￿ s
quest to maximise extracted rents from its colonies. The results suggest multiple
optimal solutions, depending on the speci￿cation of the production function, the
governance technology chosen by the coloniser and the technological parameters of
the model. For instance, in agrarian colonial societies, the results suggest that under
a technology of governance by numbers, a large elite population is a direct re￿ ection
of a high productivity-enhancing technology by the coloniser. In contrast, under a
governance technology by quality, the better the productivity-enhancing technology,
the lower the quality of human capital that is transferred to the elite. Additionally,
under a composite governance technology, and given non-linearity conditions de￿ned




threshold, the better the productivity-enhancing
technology, the smaller the optimal elite size that is chosen by the coloniser. An
alternative set of results is obtained assuming an industrial economic set-up (or
interdependent production). These results suggest that the long debate about the
apparent superiority of one European colonisation experience over the other is much
more intricate than is often perceived in the literature. The insight from the model
is also useful in understanding why the stock of human capital available in countries
emerging from colonisation varied considerably across colonial experiences and from
one country to another.
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11 Introduction
This paper examines optimality conditions in a co-optive strategy of colonial rule in
agrarian and industrial African economies. It assumes rationality on the part of all agents,
namely - the colonisers, the indigenous elites and the general population. It assumes
further that human capital transfers from the colonisers to the elites of the colonies occupy
centre-stage in a co-optive governance strategy. The purpose of human capital transfers is
to enhance the productivity of the elites, which in turn, increases the rents that accrue to
the colonisers. However, human capital transfers to the elite also raises their aspirations
to a greater wellbeing, which e⁄ectively reduces the rent ￿ ow to the colonisers.
This suggests that in the transfer of human capital to the elite, the colonisers face a
choice tension between enhancing productivity gains for the economy on the one hand, and
minimising power losses as a result of the rising aspirations of the elite on the other hand.
How this choice tension is handled depends on a number of parameters, namely - the
choice of governance technology, the productivity distance between elites and masses, the
returns to human capital and the speci￿cation of the production function. The coloniser￿ s
choice of governance technology is assumed to be a function of its pattern of human capital
transfers, which in turn depends on its colonial educational ideology. To di⁄erentiate the
governance technology options of the colonisers, we focus on the contrasting approaches to
human capital transfers in the British and French sub-Saharan African empires in general,
although speci￿c reference is made to West Africa. But ￿rst a brief historical introduction
is necessary to set the stage for the subsequent sections of the chapter.
1.1 Historical Background
The debate preceding the scramble for Africa suggests that colonies o⁄ered an expected
return to the colonisers.1 Once territories were acquired, it became imperative for the
colonisers to choose the governance strategy that maximised their expected return. His-
torical evidence points to two major strategies of colonial governance, namely - absolute
1Whilst on most occasions these payo⁄s could be expressed in economic terms, in other instances -
they were cultural or geo-strategic.
2subjugation2 and co-optation in governance.3
It is believed that towards the late nineteenth century, orthodox colonial ideology in
Africa had shifted from absolute subjugation to the co-optation of elites.4 Co-optation in
governance - is presumably an idea ￿rst explored by Sir Arthur Gordon in Fiji (1874-80),5
but it was not until Frederick Lugard governed in Nigeria during the ￿rst two decades of
the twentieth century that it became orthodox colonial ideology, Bolton (1973:69). In its
original conception, the British co-optation strategy aimed to provide western education
only to the sons of chiefs, who would later inherit traditional authority as educated chiefs
capable of intermediating between the British government and the indigenous population,
Foster (1965), and McWilliam & Kwamena-Poh (1978).
The idea was that the newly educated chiefs were more likely to favourably appreciate
British civilisation and defend the interests of the Crown in the colony. As such, Article
9 of the treaty of 1817 signed by the Kings of Ashanti and Juaben required that:
￿ The kings agree to commit their children to the care of the Governor-in-Chief
for education at Cape Coast Castle, in full con￿dence of the good intentions of
the British Government and of the bene￿ts to be derived therefrom￿ .
Just as the British established the Castle School for sons of chiefs at Cape Coast, the
French also created the "Ecole des H￿tages" in 1854 in Senegal for the sons of chiefs.6 This
2Absolute subjugation or military dictatorship generally entails the use of repression to appropriate
the resources of the colonies, and is assumed to involve minimal redistribution to the population of the
colonies. For instance, it is popularly claimed that the pioneer colonial governance strategy was by direct
military rule.
3Co-optation in governance or better still, indirect rule, meant the retention of traditional authorities
as agents of local government entrusted with power by the colonial administration and is based on the
philosophy that it was possible to utilise traditional political institutions in development. The envisaged
administrative role of co-opted agents was to ensure law and order, collect taxes and supply labour.
4It can be argued that this shift was a rational decision on the part of the colonisers, owing to the
increasing costs associated with military dictatorship. These costs were rising rapidly as the presence
of a military provoked resistance from the indigenous population, which necessitated the deployment of
further resources to quell the rebellion. Furthermore, the lessons of the Indian revolt in 1857 made the
option of military dictatorship even less appealing to the metropolitan powers. It is to be recalled that
the 1857 Indian revolt was provoked by the British attempt at taking over native Indian states whose
rulers had left no heirs. This provoked sections of both the Hindu and Muslim communities into rebellion.
Martin (2005), Piers Brendon (2005) and Maddison (1971:42) have argued that the Indian revolt in 1857,
though unsuccessful, signalled to the British colonial power that the option of military intervention is not
always optimal and the lessons of the revolt raised awareness that sparked o⁄ early nationalist activism
in most parts of the British empire.
5Prior to this date, sources reveal that attempts were already made at training the to-be co-opted
elites but the actual utilisation of these elites in governance was supposedly ￿rst experimented by Sir
Arthur Gordon.
6See Foster (1965)
3suggests that both the British and French colonial administrations pursued an "aristo-
cratic" policy of recruitment into special institutions that trained elites for use in colonial
administration. In addition, both British and French colonial masters maintained a rel-
atively small administrative bureaucracy. This similarity naturally blurs the distinction
usually made between "indirect rule" as administered by the British and "direct rule" as
administered by the French colonial powers in their respective colonies.7
Furthermore, historical sources,8 claim that during the 1920￿ s and 1930￿ s, there was
a trend towards convergence in both theory and practice in the British and French west
African colonial empires, and colonial administrators in both empires worked under similar
material limitations. For instance, until very late in the colonial period, the colonies of
both empires were expected to be ￿nancially self-su¢ cient, and the administrators had
to manage their districts with meagre resources in money and technical personnel.
In spite of the observed similarities in the practice of co-optation, there were never-
theless some marked di⁄erences between the British and French approaches. It has been
argued that the British system of co-optation di⁄ered from that of the French mainly in
the area of educational transfers. The British had initially relegated educational provision
to missionary bodies, who trained without regard for placement, whereas, the French ad-
ministered education through state-owned schools and thus had a more strict management
of educational turn-over than the British. Wallerstein (1959:59) notes that:9
￿British educational policy was haphazard and neglected placement, in part
because it was largely in the hands of the missions, whereas the French educa-
tional policy, conducted largely in state-owned schools, was more systematic.
The French trained only those for whom they were willing to ￿nd a position
in the colonial structure. But the British trained without regard for this, and
they did not expand the positions available for African placement to meet the
expanded supply".
Because the British tolerated rival educational institutions, and emphasised village
schools and the use of local vernacular languages as medium of instruction in their colonies,
7Foster (1965:140-141) argues that, the British were never really consistent in their choice of "indirect
rule". For instance, at the inception of "indirect rule", the British emphasised the role of traditional
African chieftaincy institutions in the administration of their colonies at the expense of the educated
African elites. But when discontent started mounting from the latter, the British reluctantly resorted
to using the elites in administration, as the French originally did, and most of the elites utilised in the
British colonies were not sons of Chiefs as was in the original plan.
8See for instance, Gann & Duignan (1970) and Gi⁄ord & Louis (1971).
9Hailey (1957:1197) shares a similar view.
4educational turn-over in British colonies tended to be comparatively higher than in French
colonies where primary pupils needed to be boarded to far-away schools where they were
taught by French teachers, using French textbooks and French language as medium of
instruction.
Furthermore, it appears that the British were less stringent than the French in setting
and pursuing their educational priorities. For instance, Foster (1965:60) and McWilliam
& Kwamena-Poh (1978:23-24) document the ￿rst abortive British attempt at co-opting
two Asante Princes (Ansa, the son of the former Asantehene and Inkwantabissa, son of the
incumbent), who were sent to England for education in 1831 in order to become British
agents on the Gold Coast. On return to the Gold Coast in 1841, neither of them agreed
to stay in the court of the Asante chiefdom, choosing rather to settle permanently in
Cape Coast on British government pensions. Hailey (1957:1197) argues that the French,
by contrast, were more purposeful than the British in both the provision of advanced
education and in utilisation of their trained manpower.
One of the most acclaimed merits of co-optation in governance, is that it was inex-
pensive and less distortionary on pre-existing traditional political institutions. However,
co-optation had a major unanticipated consequence on empires, by raising the aspirations
to power of the indigenous elites, which partly contributed to the demise of colonisation.
A possible reason for this is that, as Fedderke & Kularatne (2008) have argued, educa-
tional transfers from the elite (here denoted by the colonisers) to the poor in society (here
denoted by the indigenous elite) raises the political aspirations of the latter, which in turn,
erodes the power of the former. This suggests that, in the transfer of human capital to
the indigenous elites of their colonies, the colonisers faced a trade-o⁄ between enhancing
the productivity of these elites and minimising power losses to them.
1.2 Research Question
On the assumption that co-optive governance entails the transfer of human capital from
the colonisers to the indigenous elites, and given the inherent trade-o⁄ between produc-
tivity gains for the colony and power losses by the colonisers, a fundamental question
that needs to be addressed is what degree of human capital should be transferred to the
indigenous elite. In other words, what format of elite, in terms of size10 and quality,11
10Refering to small or large elite dimension.
11Refering to the number of years of education to be given to a representative member of the elite
population.
5should be chosen by the colonisers?
This paper seeks to answer the above question by presenting a simple model of elite for-
mation emanating from the colonisers quest to maximise extracted rents from its colonies.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical framework, the
core predictions of the model and a discussion of the results. Section 3 presents some
empirical data in justi￿cation of the relevance of the model, while section 4 concludes.
2 Theoretical Framework
We now outline a simple model to formalise the ideas discussed in the preceding section,
the hope being to determine the likely optimal combinations of elite size and quality
that satisfy the coloniser￿ s objective of simultaneously enhancing productivity gains and
minimising power losses. But ￿rst a note of caution is in order. The model we describe
below is a stylisation and is not intended as an accurate representation of historical events.
2.1 The Environment
The basic premise is that, acting as rational agents in pursuance of their own self-interest,
the colonisers need necessarily to transfer human capital in the form of education to a
select portion of the indigenous population of their colonies. The education received by
this select group of individuals (whom we henceforth call the elite) distinguishes them
from the rest of the population (henceforth referred to as the masses). The purpose of
educational transfers to the elite is to raise their productivity and output, which in turn
increases the size of the pie from which the coloniser appropriates.
In other words, under an elite co-optation governance strategy, the coloniser selectively
redistributes some of its own human capital resources to the indigenous population with
the sole intention of raising the latter￿ s productivity for optimal extraction. Although Ace-
moglu & Robinson (2001b) assume human capital cannot be transferred, it is a legitimate
assumption in this paper based on school enrolment levels. However, because educational
transfers to the elite raises their aspirations to greater wellbeing, which in turn erodes
the power of the colonisers,12 there is a threshold level of educational transfers that any
coloniser would not allow.
The coloniser￿ s aim is to appropriate the maximum possible proportion of output
produced in the colony and this is a function of its power. We express this power of
12The coloniser￿ s power is de￿ned in terms of its ability to appropriate the resources of the colony.
6the coloniser to appropriate the colony￿ s resources in terms of three di⁄erent types of
governance technologies depending on the speci￿c characteristic of the elite (size, quality
or both) that the coloniser emphasises. We refer to these as a technology of governance by
numbers, a technology of governance by quality and a composite governance technology
respectively.
In a technology of governance by numbers, it is assumed that the coloniser￿ s emphasis
is on getting the "right" size of the elite population that will maximise output. Given an
elite that is productive, having many of them, as opposed to few, is plausibly a rational
option for the colonisers. However, in spite of its potential productivity advantage, it
makes sense for the coloniser to control the elite size because the bigger the latter, the
more costly (in terms of power loss) it is to the coloniser. Accordingly, the concept of
power is hereby de￿ned solely in terms of relative population proportions, that is, the
ratio of the population constituting the local elite in the total population.
In a technology of governance by quality, we assume that the emphasis of the coloniser
is on transferring the requisite stock of human capital that the elites need in order to pro-
duce optimally. This is because the better the quality of human capital endowment of the
elites, the more productive they are. However, there is a threshold stock of human capital
transfers that the colonisers would not allow, because the greater the elite￿ s endowment
of human capital, the smaller will be the power of the colonisers.13 Thus, in this case the
concept of power is characterised in terms of the total stock of human capital which the
group constituting the local elite holds relative to that held by the total population.
In a composite governance technology, the emphasis of the coloniser is on both the
size of the elite and on the stock of human capital that it holds. Given an elite that
is productive, having many of them who are endowed with high quality human capital
enhances society￿ s productivity. However, increasing the size or quality dimension of the
elite or both dimensions, also potentially decreases the power of the colonisers. Hence the
need to specify the optimal level of the size and quality of these transfers.
Finally, the model rests on the following set of assumptions: that all agents are ra-
tional, members of each population group (colonisers, indigenous elites and general pop-
ulation) are homogenous, military dictatorship and co-optation strategies are mutually
exclusive, and the colonisers and elites monopolise power while the population masses
13A more educated elite potentially has greater aspirations to wellbeing which in turn threatens the
power of the coloniser.
7hold no power.14 The model also abstracts from remuneration of factors of production15
and from the cost of human capital transfers to the elite.16
2.2 The Model
Consider a society that has been colonised by a foreign power. Suppose that initially
the society is comprised of one group of individuals - the indigenous population masses
(D). Members of this group are assumed to be homogenous. Assuming that there is no
population growth, the total population in the society, L, is exactly equal to the indigenous
population, Ld, that is:
L = L
d
After the coloniser arrives, he creates a new group of individuals we term the elite (E),
whose members are previous members of the indigenous population mass Ld, implying


















where Le and Lp denote the population of the elite group and the new size of the popu-
lation mass group respectively. At any point in time, the size of the elite population, Le
is determined by the coloniser, whereas the total population is exogenously given.
Prior to the arrival of the coloniser, all members of the indigenous population mass
group, Ld, are endowed with a baseline human capital of h. This baseline human capital
can be thought of in terms of a ￿xed stock of basic knowledge acquired through traditional
learning methods by each member of the indigenous population.
14This is for purposes of simpli￿cation, although from an analytical standpoint, it still makes sense to
neglect the power of the population masses, because, according to our assumptions, the masses hold a
negligible amount of human capital, implying that their associated aspirations are equally negligible.
15For instance, wages to the elite and subsistence wages paid to the agrarian population.
16It might be the case that the colonisers transfer some of their own human capital to the elite of the
colonies, hence internalising these costs onto themselves.
8The primary objective of the coloniser is to maximise extraction of the colony￿ s re-
sources for the furtherance of its own empire.17 In so doing, it selectively redistributes
some of its human capital resources to the indigenous population in order to raise the
latter￿ s productivity.
Thus in this model, the coloniser transfers human capital (￿) only to the elites who
wind up with a higher endowment of human capital resources (1 + ￿)h relative to the
general population masses, who own h. It is worth emphasising that the distinction
between the elite and the general population is made solely in terms of their relative
endowments of human capital, which stems from the fact that the coloniser redistributes
human capital, ￿, to the elite group only. This is exempli￿ed, for instance, by the fact
that the elite are o⁄ered the opportunity of formal schooling which is not available to the
general population. However, human capital transfers made to the elite can be either of
low quality (low ￿), implying fewer years of formal schooling, or of high quality (high ￿),
implying comparatively higher number of years of formal schooling.
Co-optation of the elite has only one major cost to the coloniser, which is that it
reduces the ￿ ow of rents to the coloniser, as the elites e⁄ectively appropriate some of it.
These rent losses translate into diminishing power of the coloniser.
In pursuing its extraction strategy, the coloniser factors in two main concerns: - on
the one hand, the returns from production in the colony, which are a function of human
capital transfers to the elite. And on the other hand, the coloniser￿ s ability to appropriate
output that is produced in the colony, which is a function of it￿ s power.
We examine both concerns in turn, starting ￿rst with the returns from productive ac-
tivity in the colony. For simplicity, we start with an additively separable (or independent)
production function which depicts a typical agrarian colonial economic set-up wherein the
elite and population mass groups do entirely di⁄erent things. Later, we consider a more
advanced or industrial colonial economic set-up whereby the elite and mass sectors depend
on each other in production (or better still, interdependent production).
2.2.1 Independent Production
Following Hirschleifer (1995) and Fedderke & Kularatne (2008), we assume an agrarian
society wherein members of each segment (elite or general population) pursue separable
17Many historical sources have argued that an important motive for empire is the extraction of raw
materials for use in production in the imperial economy. See for instance, Rhoda (1973:19), Bolton
(1973:24) and Douglas (1978:265).
9production. Assuming a simple production function with human capital as the only factor









where Ae and A represents the technology that is available to the elite and mass sectors
of the population respectively, and de￿nitionally, Ae > A. It makes sense to distinguish
the production technology of the elite from that of the masses, because the human capital
received by the elites opens them access to new and superior technology of doing things.





> 1 represents increasing returns
= 1 represents constant returns




One deduces from equation 1 above that a high return from production in the colony
is obtained by giving a high number of years of formal schooling (high ￿), to as many
elite (Le), as possible while fewer years of formal schooling produces low return.19
The second preoccupation of the coloniser concerns its power or ability to appropriate
output produced in the colony.
2.2.2 Operationalisation of the Concept of Power
Recalling the initial assumption that only the coloniser and elites hold power while the
general population is passive, we characterise the power of the coloniser in terms of its
ability to appropriate a proportion of the output produced in the colony. Correspondingly,
the power of the elite is a function of its ability to appropriate e⁄ectively some of the rents
that normally would have accrued to the coloniser.20
We express these concepts of power in terms of three di⁄erent types of governance
technologies, namely - technology by numbers, technology by quality and lastly as a
composite technology which is a combination of numbers and quality.
18Observe that output under elite co-optation is higher than that obtained in the absence of human
capital transfers, as long as the productivity of the elite is higher than that of the masses.
19See that as long as Ae > A; @Y
@Le > 0 and @Y
@￿ > 0.
20It therefore goes without saying that the power of the coloniser and that of the elites are mutually
exclusive. We assume for simplicity that the two sum up to unity.
10Technology of Governance by Numbers Here the concept of power is de￿ned solely
in terms of relative population proportions, that is, the ratio of the population constituting




Lp + Le =
Le




Correspondingly, the power of the coloniser as a function of the technology by numbers,
rc (Le) is given as:
r
c (L





It is easy to see from equation 2 above that the coloniser￿ s power is a decreasing func-
tion of the elite dimension, Le whilst, correspondingly, the elites￿power is an increasing
function of their numbers.







+ A(L ￿ L
e)h
￿i
The coloniser uses its power, rc (Le) = L￿Le
L , to appropriate the maximum possible
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where Ae > A.
The coloniser takes Ae; A, L, ￿, ￿ and h as given21 and selects Le to maximise equation
3 above with the relevant ￿rst order condition being:
h
￿ h
2A(Le ￿ L) ￿ Ae (1 + ￿)
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￿
A ￿ Ae (1 + ￿)
￿
#
< 1 whenever Ae > 2A (5)
21￿ is not a choice dimension here because it could be the case that the coloniser has a ￿xed education
technology. Say, for instance, it always trains the elite of its colonies in village schools or at the Grandes
Ecoles.
11Equation 5 suggests that the only logic for having an elite under a governance tech-
nology by numbers is that the elites are at least twice more productive than the masses.22
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The same symmetrical interpretation holds for equations 8 and 9 above. In other
words, equations 7, 8 and 9 above suggest that under a governance technology by numbers
in agrarian colonial economies, large elite formation is a direct re￿ection of a su¢ ciently
high productivity-enhancing technology by the coloniser. Symmetrically, a small elite size
suggests an ine¢ cient technology of co-optation/governance by the coloniser. The impli-
cation of this is that, under a technology of governance by numbers, productivity gains
always dominate power loss.
The intuition behind these results is that, under a technology of governance by numbers
in agrarian colonial economies, the coloniser with a more e⁄ective technology (represented
by high Ae
A , ￿, and ￿) is able to co-opt more elites than the one with a less e⁄ective tech-
nology (represented by low Ae
A , ￿, and ￿). In agrarian African societies, where the British,
in comparison to the French, are known to have educated a relatively large segment of the
22Observe also that the denominator of equation 5 is always negative. Hence, in order for L
e￿
L > 0, the
numerator of equation 5 must necessarily be negative as well, and this is de￿ned only for
h





12population of their colonies, this insight suggests that the British probably had a more
e⁄ective governance technology than the French.
Technology of Governance by Quality Here the concept of power is characterised
solely in terms of the total stock of human capital that the group constituting the local












Observe from equation 10 above that the coloniser￿ s power is a decreasing function
of the quality of human capital that it transfers to the elite and, correspondingly, the
elites￿power is an increasing function of the quality of human capital that it receives. In
particular, more years of schooling given to the elites enhances their ability to appropriate
some of the rents that normally would have accrued to the coloniser.
The coloniser uses its power, rc (￿) = 1
1+￿, to appropriate the maximum possible
proportion of output produced in the colony. Formally, the extraction function of the
coloniser under a technology of governance by quality is given as:
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where all the parameters are the same as de￿ned in equation 3 above.
The coloniser takes Ae, A, L, Le, ￿ and h as given23 and selects ￿ to maximise equation
11 above, with the relevant ￿rst order condition being:
h
￿ h
A(Le ￿ L) + Ae (1 + ￿)
￿ Le (￿ ￿ 1)
i
(1 + ￿)
2 = 0 (12)
Solving for ￿
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Equation 14 above suggests that under a governance technology by quality in agrarian





, necessarily demands the transfer of low
quality human capital under high-productivity conditions (￿ > 1). On the other hand, a
smaller elite size demands the transfer of high quality human capital under low-productivity
conditions (￿ < 1).
Similarly, equations 15 and 16 suggest that the better the productivity-enhancing
technology (represented by Ae
A and ￿ respectively), the lower the quality of human capital
transferred to the elite of the colonies.
The intuition behind these results is that under a technology of governance by quality
in agrarian colonial economies, a coloniser with an e⁄ective technology does not need to
transfer high quality human capital to the local elite. It might be the case, for instance,
that the coloniser is able to adapt technology transfer to local realities.24 Symmetrically,
the coloniser with a less e⁄ective technology of governance need necessarily to transfer
high quality human capital to the local elite (due, for instance, to poor technological
adaptation).
Composite Technology of Governance Finally, under a composite technology of
governance, both the size of the elite and the quality of human capital given to them
matter in the power structure. The power of the elite is expressed as a function of both
their numbers and the quality of human capital that they have. Here, re is de￿ned as:
24One way of thinking about this is perhaps, the administration of formal educational instruction in






Le (1 + ￿)
L + ￿Le < 1
Correspondingly, the power of the coloniser as a function of a composite governance
technology, rc (￿, Le) is de￿ned as:
r
c (￿, L
e) = 1 ￿ r
e =
L ￿ Le
L + ￿Le < 1 (17)
Equation 17 above shows that @rc
@Le < 0 and @rc
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implying that the rate of change in the coloniser￿ s power due to the change in elite size
increases at high levels of transfer, ￿, and decreases otherwise.
The coloniser uses its power, rc (￿, Le) = L￿Le
L+￿Le, to appropriate the maximum possible
proportion of output produced in the colony. The extraction function of the coloniser
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The coloniser takes Ae, A, L, ￿ and h as given and selects ￿ and Le to maximise
equation 18 above, with the relevant ￿rst order conditions being:
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Expressing Le￿
L in terms of ￿
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Equations 22 and 23 tell us that there is concavity in the relationship between elite
size and productivity distance between the elites and the masses, implying, in principle,
that a large elite size is feasible whenever the productivity distance between elites and
masses is large enough. Equation 24 suggests that there is a range of feasible values of
the optimal elite size over which an increase in the quality of human capital transfers
necessitates an increase in the elite size, and another range over which it reduces the elite
16Table 1: Optimality Conditions under Composite Governance Technology in Agrarian
Societies (Human Capital Transfers versus Elite Size)
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size.25
Equation 24 also enables us to deduce the following analytical results which are sum-
marised in Table 1 above. The results in Table 1 suggest that a coloniser with a poor
technology of governance (represented by an Ae
A <
2(1+￿)
(1+￿)￿), can either transfer low human
capital to a small elite or high human capital to a large elite. On the other hand, a




to transfer either low human capital to a large elite or high human capital to a small elite.
Also, equation 25 suggests that there is a range of feasible values of the elite size over
which an increase in the returns to human capital necessitates an increase in the elite size
and another range over which it reduces the elite size. Furthermore, equation 25 enables
us to deduce the following analytical results which are summarised in Table 2 below.
The results in Table 2 suggest that a coloniser with a poor technology of governance
(represented by an Ae
A <
2(1+￿)log(1+￿)
￿(1+￿)￿ ), is able to constitute a small elite only when
the returns to human capital are low. In contrast, when the returns to human capital
are high, a coloniser with a poor technology is able to co-opt a large elite. On the




￿(1+￿)￿ ), is able to constitute a small elite only when the returns to human
capital are high and a large elite only when the returns to human capital are low.
These results suggests that the governance-by-quality story also dominates in a compos-
ite technology of governance. In general, as the productivity dimensions
￿
i:e: ￿, ￿, and Ae
A
￿





decreases. However, there are now non-linearities de￿ned
by the Ae
A threshold.
25This suggests that there is a trade-o⁄ between the optimal elite size and the quality of human
capital transfers that maximise the coloniser￿ s extraction function. Numerical simulations of the optimal
combination of elite size and human capital transfers that maximise the coloniser￿ s objective function
were also attempted, but, due to the complexity of equation 21, these optimal solutions were di¢ cult to
￿nd.
17Table 2: Optimality Conditions under Composite Governance Technology in Agrarian
Societies (Returns to Human Capital versus Elite Size)
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2.2.3 Interdependent Production
Continuing to use a simple production function with human capital as the only factor
of production, we now assume that the elites and general population are dependent on
each other, represented by the interaction of their respective productions.26 This feature
is obtained by using a general form of the production function wherein output produced
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where also, Ae and A represent the technology that is available to the elite and mass
sectors of the population respectively, and de￿nitionally, Ae > A, and Y denotes total
output. Finally, ￿ and ￿ represent returns to human capital in the elite and mass sectors
of society respectively; such that:




> 1 represents increasing returns
= 1 represents constant returns




We assume as before that the power of the coloniser (or elites) is a function of three
di⁄erent types of governance technologies.
Technology of Governance by Numbers As before, under this technology, the
coloniser takes Ae; A, L, ￿, ￿ and h as given and selects Le to maximise the following
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with the relevant ￿rst order condition being:
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Equation 30 above suggests that the optimal elite size depends solely on the returns
to human capital in the mass sector of society and does not depend on the technological
parameters of the model. In particular, a rise in the returns to human capital in the
mass sector necessitates a reduction in the size of the optimal elite population and vice
versa. The implications of this result is that under a governance technology by numbers
in industrial colonial economies, the optimal elite size never exceeds 50% of the total
population. In other words, even if the general population were to be totally unproductive
(i.e. ￿ = 0), the coloniser would still not constitute a 100% elite.
Technology of Governance by Quality As before, under this technology, the coloniser
takes Ae; A, L, Le, ￿ and h as given and selects ￿ to maximise the following extraction
function:
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with the relevant ￿rst order condition with respect to ￿ being:
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￿ = 0 (33)
Notice that the ￿rst order condition represented by equation 32 above is either always
positive (under increasing returns) or always negative (under decreasing returns). Hence,
19there is no optimal quality of human capital (￿
￿), given Le
L , that maximises equation 31
above. In stead, this scenario suggests two extreme outcomes which are to either transfer
an in￿nite amount of human capital to a de￿ned elite size when there are increasing
returns, or to transfer no human capital at all when there are decreasing returns.
A plausible intuition behind this result is that, under a technology of governance by
quality in industrial colonial societies, the colonisers do not necessarily govern by elite
formation. Rather, they could either completely assimilate the colony into the imperial
(or metropolitan) population27 (in which case - they transfer an in￿nite amount of human
capital to the indigenes of the colony) or they could simply adopt a target group (e.g.
ethnic group) to whom they do not give any preferential human capital transfers (￿ ! 0).
Composite Technology of Governance As before, under this technology, the coloniser
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with the relevant ￿rst order condition being with respect to Le:
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Expressing Le￿
L in terms of ￿














which is de￿ned for:
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￿ > 0 and ￿ < 1 (40)
Equation 38 above tells us that under a composite governance technology in industrial
colonial economies, it is always optimal to transfer either high human capital to a small
elite or human capital to a large elite.
Similarly, equation 39 suggests that under a composite governance technology in in-
dustrial colonial economies, whenever the returns to human capital in the elite sector (￿)
are high, the coloniser tends to constitute a large elite and vice versa.
Also, equation 40 suggests that whenever the returns to human capital in the mass
sector of society (￿) are high, the coloniser tends to constitute a small elite and vice versa.
In summary, the results suggest that under a composite governance technology in in-
dustrial colonial economies, there is a necessary trade-o⁄ between raising the quality of






3 Empirical Data and Relevance of the Model
The results from the model suggest that the optimal elite characteristics that maximise the
coloniser￿ s objective function depend on a number of parameters, namely - the choice of
governance technology, the productivity distance between elites and masses, the returns
to human capital and the speci￿cation of the production function. In particular, the
optimal elite characteristics vary with the type of production in which the economy is
specialised.
For instance, given a technology of governance by numbers or quality in agrarian
21colonial economies, the model suggests that whenever the coloniser is in possession of an
e⁄ective technology of governance (represented by a high Ae
A ), or whenever the returns to
human capital in the colony are high, it generally tends to constitute a bigger elite than
otherwise. In contrast, under a composite technology of governance, a coloniser with an
e⁄ective technology can either transfer low human capital to a large elite or high human
capital to a small elite. Similarly, the coloniser with an ine⁄ective technology can either
transfer low human capital to a small elite or high human capital to a large elite.
Panel A of Figure 1 below presents some proxies that we use in comparing the sizes of
the total elite force in a select sample of former SSA colonies. These are the percentage
gross secondary enrolment rate (SEC ENRO), and the percentage of secondary school
attained in the total population aged 15 and above (SEC15).28 We also use the average
schooling years in the total population over the age of 15 (TYR15) as a proxy for the
quality of human capital transferred to the local elite.
The evidence in Panel A is consistent with the British opening access to education
to a greater proportion of the population in their colonies than did the French. Panel A
also suggests that the Portuguese and Belgians had the lowest educational transfers to
the elite of their former SSA colonies.
In line with the predictions of the model, one might plausibly conclude that in general,
the British imperial power had a more e⁄ective governance technology in Africa than either
their French, Portuguese or Belgians counterparts. However, when considering a case-by-
case comparison of former colonies, this statement will have to be properly quali￿ed, as
the British were probably more e⁄ective (compared to the French) in some colonies but
less e⁄ective in others. This historical data provides independent support for the relevance
of our model.
4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we examined the conditions of optimality in a co-optive strategy of colonial
rule. The central premise of the chapter is that, as rational agents, the colonisers often
had to make decisive choices from amongst con￿ icting options. One of these choices is
the optimal size and quality of the indigenous elite with whom they governed the colonies
together. This is as a result of the fact that human capital transfers to the elite engender
both productivity gains and power loses to the colonisers.
28Both variables are measured in the year of independence of the country.
22Figure 1: Comparative Statistics on Human Capital Transfers in Selected SSA Countries
at Independence.
COUNTRY Ind Date SEC Enro SEC15 TYR15 COUNTRY Ind Date SEC Enro SEC15 TYR15 COUNTRY Ind Date SEC Enro SEC15 TYR15 COUNTRY Ind DateSEC Enro SEC15 TYR15
Botswana 1966 3.8 3.02 1.68 Benin 1960 2 1.3 Guinea Bissau 1975 3 0.4 Rwanda 1962 2 4.86
Gambia 1965 6 5.3 Cameroon 1960 2 9.7 1.74 Mozambique 1975 3 1.6 0.64 Zaire 1960 3 1.4 0.76
Ghana 1957 0.2 1.6 0.97 Cape Verte 1960 2
Kenya 1963 3.2 2.42 1.61 Cen Africa Rep. 1960 1 3.6 0.57
Lesotho 1966 4.6 1.6 2.99 Congo, Rep. 1960 4
Malawi 1964 1.8 0.78 1.98 Cote d'Ivoire 1960 2
Mauritius 1968 19.5 3.92 Madagascar 1960 4
Nigeria 1960 4 Mali 1960 1 0.1 0.36
Sierra Leone 1961 2.6 2.64 0.67 Niger 1960 1 0.6 0.28
Sudan 1956 2.2 1.5 0.41 Senegal 1960 3 4.4 1.74
Swaziland 1968 14 6.96 2.36 Togo 1960 2 0.22
Tanzania 1961 2 1.2 3.26
Uganda 1962 3.4 3.8 1.17
Zambia 1964 6 5.9 2.81
Zimbabwe 1980 8 4.9 2.13
Average 4.41 4.36 1.99 Average 2.18 3.28 0.82 Average 3 1 0.64 Average 2.5 3.13 0.76
Sources: World Development Indicators for % Gross Secondary Enrolments (SEC Enro); The Africa Research Program dataset for % Secondary School Attainment in the total Pop aged 15 and above
(SEC15), Average Schooling Years in the total Pop aged 15years and above (TYR15).




British Former  Colonies in SSA French Former Colonies in SSA Portuguese Former Colonies in SSA Belgian Former Colonies in SSA
PANEL A - DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
PANEL B - MEANS BY COLONIAL BACKGROUND
2.18 3 2.5 4.41*
BRITISH SSA FRENCH SSA
3.13
Notes: Asterisks indicate results of t-tests. The null hypothesis is that the mean is the same as the mean for former French SSA.






23We have thus proposed a simple model of elite formation emanating from a coloniser￿ s
quest simultaneously to enhance productivity gains and minimise power losses. The results
of the model suggest multiple optimal solutions, depending on the speci￿cation of the
production function, the governance technology chosen by the coloniser, the returns to
human capital, as well as the parameterisation of the productivity distance between elites
and the population masses.
For instance, in agrarian colonial societies, the results suggest that under a technol-
ogy of governance by numbers, a large elite population is a direct re￿ ection of a high
productivity-enhancing technology by the coloniser. Symmetrically, a small elite size sug-
gests an ine⁄ective technology of co-optation/governance by the coloniser. Under a gov-
ernance technology by quality in agrarian colonial societies, the better the productivity-
enhancing technology, the lower the quality of human capital that is transferred to the
elite. Additionally, under a composite governance technology in agrarian societies, and






better the productivity-enhancing technology, the smaller the optimal elite size that is
chosen by the coloniser. An alternative set of results is obtained assuming an industrial
economic set up (or interdependent production).
These results suggest that the long debate about the apparent e¢ cacy or superiority of
one European colonisation experience over the other is much more intricate than is often
perceived in the literature. The insight from the model is also useful in understanding
why the stock of human capital available in countries emerging from colonisation varied
considerably across colonial experiences and from one country to another.
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